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Broadrick v. Oklahoma 
Appeal from USDC WD Oklahoma (3-j eta Holloway, 
Daugherty, Eubanks) 
FIRST AMENDMENT--POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF CIVIL SERVANTS 
Appellants are employees of the Oklahoma Corporation 
Comm'n and are subject to the Stateus civil service 
r------
law. Under the civil service law employees are prohib" ..___, 
ited from soliciting contributions for a political 
organization, from becoming a member of a political 
party, from running for public office, or from 
taking part in any political campaign. If a state 
employee does any of the proscribed acts he will be 
terminated from state employment. Appellants parti-
cipated in the rewelection campaign of one of the Corp 
Comm'n Commissioners. They were charged by the Per-
sonnel Bd with violations of the statute. They filed 
suit in the USDC WD Oklahoma, claiming that the state 
statute was unconstitutional because it impermissibly 
.. 
interferred with the First Amendment political rights 
of public employees. A three"judge ct was c0nvened 
and that ct ruled against appellants and ordered the 
case dism'd.' Appellants seek direct review in this 
Court. 
The lower ct opinion is crytic but it makes the 
following conclusory points. First~ the statute prohibits 
only "partiean political activities" and does not 
preclude employees from speaking publicly or privately 
on public issues. Second, avoiding the 1~anger of 
having prommtions and discharges of civil servants 
motivated by political ramifications rather than on 
merit ' 1is a compelling justification for the narrow 
intrusion into First Amendment rights. Third 9 United 
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) is 
still good law and is controlling in this case (Mitchell 
held that the Hatch Act prohibitions against partisan 
political activity were constitutional). Appellants 
claim that the state law is not susceptible to the 
"narrowing interpretation" given it by the ct. They 
also claim that the statute sweeps too broadly and is 
not limited to justifiable state interests. Finally9 they 
assert that Mitchell is not good law in light of 
subsequent SC cases.·· 
RECOMMENDATION 
In recent months there has been a great deal of 
focusing on Mitchell and the prohibition against 
political activity. Two cases from the lower cts are 
worthy of note. The CAS recently (last September) 
.. 
,..-3--
decided a case involving a Macon, Georgia ordinance 
which prohibited local firemen from having bumper 
stickers on their cars. Judge Goldberg wrote a 
lengthy and scholarly opinion in which he held the 
Macon law unconstitutional. He discussed Mitchell 
at length and concluded that its basis had been 
severely undermined in subsequent cases. Mitchell 
was a 4-3 Justice Reed opinion indicating that 
prohibitions against partisan political activities 
could be approved if supported by a "rational justi-
fication." Subsequent cases have held that where 1st 
Amendment interests are involved an incursive law will 
be sustained only if it is supported by a "compelling 
justification." Cert was not sought in that case. 
A second, more important case, has recently been 
decided in the USDC DC. A threewjudge ct split 2-1 
in a decision holding the Hatch Act unconstitutional 
and (from what I gather) holding that Mitchell is 
no longer a viable precedent. Judge Gesell wrote the 
majority opinion and Judge MacKinnon dissented. That 
case was de~ded on -l!:lY 3?, and will, almost undoubtedly 11 
be appealed to this Ct. It is my judgment that we 
should await that case, with an eye to noting probable 
jurisdiction when it arises. The question is an import• 
ant one and there is no likelihood that the Ct will 
I wish to avoid the case. We should put this Oklahoma case an thecEO~ for the time being. Hopef~ly, 
the Ct can find a way around having to review this thing 
on its merits. There is a serious question about 
. .. 
r:,. 
.... 4 ...... 
the DC's "narrowing" interpretation. The state law 
r-'~·~~---___ ..:::::._ __ ..:_ __ _ 
seems explicitly to preclude public discussion of 
political issues. The DC opinion is not wtitten as 
an opinion but is chopped up into numbered sentences --.. 
under the titles "Findings of Fact" and "Conclusions 
of Law." It is devoid of analysis. 
HOLD FOR DC CIRCUIT HATCH ACT CASE LAH 
:~ . ·,. ·. 
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Broadrick v, Oklahoma 
Appeal from USDC WD Oklahoma 
DISCUSS 
This "Hatch Act" case was relisted to await the 
appeal of the DC Hatch Act case. I do not know the status 
of the DC appeal but this case should surely await the 
decision to appeal and eventual appeal in the DC case. 
HOLD FOR DC BASE LAH 
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To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Ju::.>ti.ce Dou~la::1 
Mr. Ju;:;tlC8 Bnmnan 
Mr. Jl,::; t:.lca St<~.;ar·t 
r;r. Jus tlO'J t8.r.sl:all 
t.:.J.· . J. c::.1 t ~..ce J:ilac1 mun 
Hr . • h~::n;.i.ce Po1:ull,l 
! .. r. Jtu;t:i.ce 1\ebny_uist 
1st DRAFT 
From: White, J. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAmated:_Ldd - 7.i 
7 
No. 71- 1639 Recirculated: ________ _ 
William M. Broadrick et al.. 
Appellants, 
v. 
~tate of Oklahoma et al . 
On Appeal from the l'n1tc•d 
States District Court for 
tht> Western District of 
Oklahoma. 
lJU11e -, 19731 
MB. Jewrrc~<: WHin; ciPlivcrC'd the opinion of the Cotirt.. 
Section 818 of Oklahoma's M(•rit System of Person1wl 
Administration Act, 74 Okla. Stat. Ann. ~ 801 et seq .. 
rpstricts the political activities of the State's classifiPd 
civil s0rvants in rnuch the sam<' manner that the Hatch 
Act proscribes partisan political activities of federal <'Ill· 
ployC'cs. Three employePs of the Oklahoma Corporation· 
Commission who are subject to the proscriptions of ~ RUf 
s<>ck to have two of its paragraphs declared unconstitu-
tional on their face aiHI pnjoined because of assert(•d 
vagu<'JH'SS and overbr0ad th . After a hearing, thr Di~­
trict ( 'ourt \D2..held the section and denied relief. :~:3R F 
Supp. 711. Wr note"cT"j)rohahle jurisdictio1;-of the ap-
[Wal. 4m) U. ~- 1058, so that appellants' claims could 
be considPred together with thoRe of their federal eoun" 
tC'rparts in U11ited States Civil Service Commissio11 \ 
.\'atio11al Associat'iou of Letter Carriers , AFL-CIO, ante . 
p - We a~ the .iudgnwJtt of thr District Court. 
SC'ction 818 was enacted in l!l59 when the ~tate first 
Pstahlif'hecl its M(•rit System of Personnel Administra-
tion .' Tlw secti011 servps roughly tlw same function as 
1 Tlw ~('!'I ion I'l'ad~ ''~ follow~. 
"I I I 1\To prrso11 111 the da~sifird "'' ' VH'P "hall lw appointrd to, or 
cl(•motPcl 01 dism'""rd from '"'~· [H)' '' 1011 i11 t hP !'las:sified ::;rrvH'l', or 
71-Hi:{O-<H)I~IOK 
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tlw analogous provisions of th0 oth0r 49 States, 2 and 
is patt0rned on ~ 9 (a) of the Hatch Act." Wjthout 
question. a broad rang0 of political activjties and con-
in an.1· '''"·'· fa vor<'d or dt~erinunatl'd agatn~t II ' II h t'<'~JWl'l to rmploy-
nwnt in t ht• dn~~ifkd 1:iC'I'I'H'<' i>rrall:<<' of ht~ polttt<"al or relig1011~ 
opinton~ or aff'iliatton~. or h<•<·all:<r of racr. <·n·Pd. color or natwnal 
origin or i>~· r<'a"on of an.1· ph~·"tral h:utdic·ap :<o ].)ltg a:< thr phycH!':d 
handicap do<·~ nol prrvrnt or rPnd<'t' thP Pmplo.l'('<' lr:<:< ablr to do 
t hr work for wht<"h lw I1:i Pmplo~·<·d 
"I:! I Xo JlPI'"Oll ~hall II"<' or promi~<· to II~<', dm•<"l I~· or tttdm·<·tl~. 
an.1· ofli!'i:tl f\llthoril.l ' or infltt('llt'<', whl'lh<•r po:<"<'""<'cl or antictpat<·d. 
to "reliT'<' or nttrntpt to H<'<'lll'<' for an~· JH·r~oll an appotntml'nt or 
:tdvanlng<' 111 appointnwn1 to a po,..t1ton 111 thr !'ia":<ifiPd :<<'I'I' IC<' . or 
an mrn·a~<· 111 pay or other advantagt• 111 l'tllplo~ · nH·nt 111 :In~· :<ll<'il 
po,..i1ton. for tlH· pmJhl:<r of infiii<'IH'tllg thr vol<' or poltlt!'al ac•twn ol 
an~· pN:<on, or for <·on,..tdrmtton; prol'ldc•d. hoii'!'I'N, th:11 l<'11N~ 
of nH tlltr~ · , n·<·ommrnda ttOn and rl'i'<•n•n<·<• b~ · p11 bite· <'Ill plo~·cr" of 
p11 bl it· olli!'taJ . ., "hall not llE' <'Oil~tdcrrd oJ!iriHl all t hon1 ~ · or 111 flurncc• 
tlnJr;o;,.. <'ltr'h 1<'11<'1' c·ontam" a thrral. tnlumdalton, ti'I'Pif'l'all1. dc•rog-
:ilor~ · or fal~t' mfonnation . 
'·[:3_1 :\o pN:<on ~h:dl mnk<• an~· fal~t' ~1atc•nH'lll , ec•rt1fical<' . mark ,. 
I'H llll!J:, or rrporl with rrga rd I o an~· tr~l, rrrt ifira I ton or appontl mrnl 
made lllld<'r mt~· provt,..ion of tht:< ,\<'1 or ll1 :Illy manner rommtt nn.1· 
fraud prr1·<·n1 mg t ht• tmpnrtwl rx<'<'ll1 1011 of t ht~ Al't and rui<o~ mad<• 
hrrrundl'r . 
"[41 :\ o c•mplo~ ·<•t • of tlw drpn rtltH·nt , <' XHlllllll'l', or o1 ht>t' JlN~ort 
~hnll tltoft•at. dt'<'l'll'<'. or oh~trur1 an.1· p<·r,..on Ill ht,.. or ill'r nght to 
<·xanunn 11011. rlil!:ihil t~ · . <'<'rltfir:ttwn. or appomt tn<'lll undl'r till" I: til', 
or fnrni~h to an~· prr,on an~· ~Jil'C'ial or H<'<'T'<'I tnform:tlton !'t)!' tlw 
]ntrpo,;<• of <·ffe<'tlll!J: thl' nghl" or pro,pt•<·t ,; of an~· pt'r"on ll'lth 
t'<'"P<'<'I 1 o rmplo~· nH' lll 111 tlw cla"''tfi<•d "l'I'I'H'l' 
"[;)[ :\o JWr:<on :<hnll. dtn•rtly or mdirrr11~ · . !J:IV<'. l'('lldt•r , p:1~ · . 
ofl't•r. "oli!'tl. or a<'<'<']l1 an~· rnone~·. ~<·n · t<·r. or oth<•r l'alunhl<• r·on-
:<td!'l'a 1 ton for or on a<·r·ount of an~· n ppom1 1lH'll1, propo,..<'d appoml-
tnl'nl . promotiOll. or propo:<l'd promoltoll to. or an~ · :tdi'Hlll :lg<' Ill , n 
post I iotl tn llw rln,..~ifiPd ~l'I'I ' IC'( '. 
"[li[ :\o rmplO.I't'l' 111 the• <·Ja,..stfic•d :<<'I'I'H'l' . and llO Ill<'llllwr of th1 · 
l't•rsonn('l Board ,.. lt :dl. dm·<· tl~ · or tlldtn•c·11~ ·. "oiH·tt. n·c·c·tl'<' , or Ill 
:Ill~ lll:lllll('l' ))(> I'OllCt•rnPd Ill ,_oJt!'t(lll!J: 01' 1'('('('1\'illg ;Ill,\' :l"·'('""llH'll1 , 
"'tll." l'l'lll1ton ot' <'OII1rthllltoll for an~· polt1tl'al orgnnlz:tttoll . c·nndidnt·~ 
or otlll'r polliH·nl purpo~<·; and no ~tatt • ofli<·t·r or :<tnt<• <'lltplo.ll'(' 
lFoot11ul e l beums 011 J! .. J, Fuu/11ulc .1 ~~ Ull p 41 
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duct are proscribed by thl' S<'ction. Paragraph six. 011P 
of the eontcstc>d portions. provides that "In lo employl'<' 
in tlw classified S<'rvice . . . shall. dirc>ctly or indir<'etly. 
in t lw tmrla~~tfi<'d ~!'fvi<"r ~hall ~oiH·tl or rr<"<'I\'(' an~· ~u('h a~:-w~~nwm. 
~llhH·ripl ion or c•ontrilmt ton from an c·mplo~·pp 111 th<' dn~~tfic·d 
ti('l'VI('l'. 
'·I 'i I Ko l'tnplo~·l'<' in the <·ln~:-tfit·d ~<·n· tr<· .·dt:dl I><' a lll<'llliH•r of 
any natiOnal. ~latr or loe:d c·omtnttl<'<' of a politte:d part~ · . or an 
officPr or mrmlwr of :1 commttt<'<' of a partt~an political elub. or :1 
candidntl' for nomination or PIPet ton to an~· patd pubiH· ofli<·c·. or 
~hall take- pari 111 thr managPm<·lll or afl"air~ of an~ · politiC'al part~ · 
01' in ill!~ politi(':ti l'HllljlHign. l'Xl'l'pl to ('X<'rei~l' lti~ nght~ H~ :1 ('liiZl'n 
privniPI~· to rxprrs~ hi~ opinion aud to cast hi~ voi<' . 
'"IS] ["poll a ~howing of ~ubst ant in! Pvidc•nc·r h~ · t lw I'N~ontwl 
l>in•ct or that an~· ofTi<·<•r or <'Ill plo.\"<'<' 111 i lH• ~~at<' dns~ifiPd ~<·n · u·< · . 
Ita:- knowinl(h· \' iolat('(l 1111~· of the• provt~toll~ of tin,., :-i<'<'llon . tlw 
St a I<' PN~0111H'I Board ~hall not d\ tlw ofiicN or c·mplo,\'C'<' so l'hnrgc·cf 
ancf tlw appointing nuthont~· 1111drr who~r jun~dH•ttoll tlw oflicN or 
<'mplo~·rr srrvr;;, If tlw offic·<·r or <'ntplo~· r<' ~o dP~trrs, t lw 81:\1 <' 
PPrson11rl Board shall hold a puhlt<' lwarmg, or shall authol'l7.<' thr 
Pt·r~onnrl Dirrctor to hold a public ]waring. and sui!Imt a tran~enpt 
therrof. logrthrr with a rr<·otmnrndatton, to tlw Stnte l'<'rsounPI 
Hoard. HPirvant wttnP~~r;:; shall I><· :dlowrd to lw pl'('~<'lll and tl'~t tfy 
at sueh hearings If tlw officrr or rmployr<· shall h<· found guilt ,\· hy 
the Stair Prr::~o1111rl Board of lh<· \'lolattoll of an~· provtstOJl of tht~ 
Section , tlw Board ~hall dirr<'t till' appot11t111g authont~· to dt~mi~~ 
~ueh officer or <•mplo)·<·<·; and till' appotllllltg authont.'· ~o dm•<·tl'd 
tihall c·ompl)· ." H Okla. Stat. Ann.~ l'li' (19()5) (paragraph <'1111111<'1"-
a I ion addrd) 
2 S<'<' ,\Ia . Cod<'. Ttt .">5. § :)J'i ( HJ.'ii'), :\la~b Stat. § :~~U5 . 1HO 
(191)1), Anz B<·,·. Slat .\nn. § 11i- 1:l01 (HJ.56) , :\lrnt S~·~tl'lll Hrg-
ulatton~ and :\1Pnt S~·~t<'m Bd. l'rol'Pdun•:-< § 1;)11 (1!:l6f)): Ark 
Rtal. Ann . § ~:3-119 (Hl47); C'al. fio,·t. Cod<·§§ 1!:l7:30- 19n5 (WP~I 
l!:lH-1) : Colo l1<·,· Stat. Ann . ~ :!C\- .5- :31 (HHi:l), Cl\'11 8('1'vtcr 
Comm 'n Hul<'~ a11d J1pgul:ttJOn>< , .\rt XJV, ~ 1 , Co11n Grn . Stat 
Amt. §5-1 no ( 195S). Hrgulat 1011~ of t hr Ci\'11 Sc·rvH'<' Comm 'n Con-
<'Pl'llillg Emplo~·rr~ 111 tlw Stat<' C'la~stfi('(l 8<'1'\'H'<' § 14-]:{ : :H Dc·l 
Codr Ann. § llO (19.'):3) ; Fl:t. 8tat. .\11n . § 110.092 (197:)). (b 
:\!Nit S~ ·,.,trm of Prrso11nrl Adm1111~tralion, Hulr;; a11d J1pgulalton:-;, 
Hull' :3 , ,r :U01- :UOn; Hawa11 HP\' Stat. § m-1. 71Hll (19(il-) , 
lrlaho Cod<' §67- 5;{11 (197:)). Ill. Ann . Stat.<' . 2-1%. §:31'1 (Smtih-
71-16:~9-0PI~IO~ 
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solicit, receive. or i11 any manner be concerned in so-
liciting or receiving any assPssment ... or contributwn 
for any political organizatioll. candidacy or other political 
purpose." Paragraph seven, the other challenged para-
graph, provides that no such employee "shall be a member 
of any national. state or local committee of a political . 
party. or an officer or member of a committee or a parti-
san political club. or a candidate for nomination or elec-
twn to any paid public offiee." That paragraph further 
llurd H!H9): Ind. Ann. :::ltnt. ~ li!}-B·+l (19i0): Iowa Cod<• Anll . 
~ 19A.ll\ (19(i7): Kan , Stat. Ann.§ 75-:.?95:{ (J9(i~)) ; K~· . R<•v . t\tnt . 
Ann. § 1~.:310 (HJ()9): La . Ctv. Codf' Ann., Art. 14, § 15 (i\) (W<·~t 
HJ51): \1<'. H<·,·. :-;tat. Ann ., Tit . .'i, § li79 (1!:Hi4). ~lei. :'llf'rll :-1~·,-t<'nt 
Hul<>" for c:rant-n1-AJ(I Ag;<'ll<'l<'" § 1)()2.2 : :VIa"::;. G<·n Law~ Ann 
(' 515, §§ 1- 15. (' . i)li. §~ :{,5-:{(i (HJ5S) : \fil'h. Hub or l'm l 8<'1'\'H'I ' 
Conun'n § 7 (19(i.5): ':'limn Stat. Ann. § ..J.:Uh (1970) ; :\II~" · :\It•nt 
S~·"t<'m Hult'"· l>f'pt. or l'ubllc Wrlfnn• , Art. XVI (191i.')): \lo. Ann. 
Stat. § :~<i.l50 (191i~)): \lo11t. Ht'\'. C'O<IP" Ann. §§ 94-14:~9. 94-l..J...J.O , 
9-J.--1-J...J.'i, 9..J.--1..J.7H (19..J.2); :\Pb. H<•v. Stat , § ~1-1:315 (19ti8). i\'<'h: 
.1oinl "'Irrit S~·~lrm Hf'l/:. for a \l!'l'it Sy~tf'm , Art. XVI (191i:3): N<'v '. 
Rulr~ for Statr l'<'r"olln<'l Admilli~tration, Hulr~ XVI. XIII (l!:Jii:3) : 
N.H. Hf'v. Stat. Ann. §§9S:11-i-9S:19 (19H8) ; N .• J. Stat. A11n. 
§ 11:17-:2 (19(i0): :\. \l<•x. ~tilt. ,\IJll . §.5- ..J.--..J.:l (195:{) : :'\. Y. C'tv. 
S<•t-v . § J07 (HJ7:{): :\. ( '. <:<·ll. :-;tilt.~§ Uli-1:{-U(i-1.1 (191)-J.) , Hub 
:llHI Hq~. of:\ . Dnk. :\ll'rit ~~·.,tt'lll,. Art. X\'1: Oh10 H<'v. C'od<· Allll 
~§ 1-J.:Ul, 1-J.:) . ..J...J.. 1..J.:U5 , 1-J.:) . ..J.ti (p . 1U54) : On· . Hf', .. Stat.§ :2(iO..J.:32 
(Hl5:{) : l'a. :-ilat. Alln .. T1t. 71 . §7..J.1.!JO..J. (1\J(i:.!): H. I. c:rn 
La\\'~ Alln. §§ :{li-..J.--51-:{ti-..J.-,'):) (191i9): ~. C. ;\Jprit ~~ ·"tem Hub 
:tnd Hq! .. ( ' i,·il 1 kft· n~< · t 'olln1·li .. \rt. X I\ '. ~ 1 : ::3. Da k. :\I Nit s~·~ t I'Ill 
Hl'g ., Art. X\'1 (19(i:{). §1: Tl'llll. l'odr Ann. §1\-:)121 (1955) . 
TPlln. Hnlr~ illld Hq!;. for . \dmtni~tNlllg: th<· Civil SrrvH'I' A<·t § 2.:{ 
(19fi:{): Tf'x. I'Pnal C'od<• .\llll ... \rt . 19.')-197 (195:)): l'tah C'od<' 
Ann . § fi/-J:~-1:{ (HJ.5:{): \ 't. Hnl<·~ and H<'g. for PN~onn<'l Admm-
l~tration § :3.0:.!: \ 'a. Snpp. to HniP~ for tlw AdmtlltHtratton of tht• 
\ 'a. I'Pr~OlllH'I At't Rnlt' l.'J.J..J. (,\). \ra~h . Ht·,· . C'oc!P Anll . § ..J.l - O!i- 250 
(HHiS): W.Va. C'mlr Allll. § :.!9- li- 1\J (1971): W1~. Stat Anll § W.:W. 
W~·o. H<·,· . H11b and H<·g~ . Hnl<' XIII ( HJiiO) 
::5 r . S. C § 7:l:.!..J. (ill . S<·t· g<·lwrall~ · l 'niterl.'itatcs ('1uli .'ieruu·e 
('u111111i~.~IOII \ ' . .'Vutionol Assur·lllltoll of /,e/te1 · Currl('rs . A/l' {,-('/0 . 
11111(' . p 
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prulllhits ::;u<'h <'Inploypp:-; fro111 "tak[ing] part in the 
m:lllHI!.<'IlH'IIt or affairs of any political party or in any 
politi<'al campaign. <'xcept to exc•rcise his right as a citizt'n 
priYat<·l~· tu t'XJ>r<'RS hi!' opinion and to cast his vote .' ' 
.\:-; ;1 c·o1npli11H'11tary IWO!'Cription (not challenged in th1:-; 
l:m:-;ttit) tlw nr!'t paragraph prohibits any person from 
" i11 Hll.\' wa~· .. IJ(•illg' ''favored or diRcriminated againRt 
with r<·sp<·ct to e1nployme11t in tlw <'iassified service be-
<·att'-'<' of hi::-: politi<'al .. . opinions or affiliatidns. " Rc,,.. 
spon:-;ihility for 1nai11tai11ing and enforcing ~EnS's prO· 
-.:('l'iptioll:-i is V<'stt'd in the Stat<.' Per::-:onnel Board and 
t h<' State P<·rRollll<'l Dirc<'tor. who i:- appointed by the 
Board. \'iolatiu11 of ~ 811'1 results in diRmissal from em-
plo~' llH'IIt and possible c·riminal sanctions and limited 
o.;tatt• <'lnpluynH' Jit i11Pligihil1ty 74 Okla Stat. An11 . 
~~ 1'118 i:IIH! XHJ . 
.\pp<'llaJit:-; do 11ot and ha\'t' not questioned Okla-
holna's right to pla<'e P\'<'n-hanckd n•strictions on thf' 
parti:::a11 politi<·al c·ondu<'t of ~:<tatE' employees. AppPl-
lants frt'l'l~ · <'OII<'<'dt' that ~ucil l'l'StrictiOil1'o serve valid and 
illlportant t'tal<' illH'r('~t~. partieularly with reRpect to 
attract i11!?: gn·atl'r lllltnbers of qualified people by insur-
i11g thc•i1 joh s<•<·urity . fn·<' from the vicissitudes of thE' 
Plt·c·ti\'t · proc·p,· :-;. all(! by protecting them from ··political 
<' .\tortio11 ... ' :-'e<· ['nited J>ublic Workers v. Mitchell, 
:no l ' ~ . 7.i . !l!l 10:1 (1!)47) . Rather. ap)ellants main-
tail! that ho\\P\'<•r p<:•rtnis:-:ibl<'. even commenc a e. thP 
goals of ~ ,"{JS lllH,\' be·. its la11guage is unC'onstitutionally 
l'ilgliC' ;till! i!R prohihitiOIIS toO OI'Oa(~ ~l' SWePp:-fail -
ing 1<;- di;'tiiJguish ht•twc><'il conduct that m~y be pru-
scrilH·d and c·onduC't that 1nust bC' permitted . For thesf' 
a11d otht·r n ·a~o11~. app<'llants assert that the sixth and 
l\r 11 f 111 1 \ i'i" !! an t - ~~ 
·· Ap]H·Il a nl- : d~o rlatm that § KlK vtolatp~ the Equal Protect!Oil 
Cl :lliH ' of tlu· Fonrt<·t•ntlt .\mrndmrnt J,~ ;;mgling out rla~sified ~NV1Cl' 
<' lllplo' ,., ., for rt ·~llwt 1011 ~ 011 ]l<lrtl~Hn pohtlC·al Pxpr<'::;swn while !eav-
I 
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SC'\'('nth paragraphs of ~ ~lS arc' void 111 toto and cailllOt 
br <'llforc<•d against th<'Ill or allYOll!' rise•." 
\\'<' han' h<•ld today that tlw llat<'II .\!'t IS not IIn-
JWnnissibly vague . . \'alional .lssociation of Leller Car-
riers, ante, p. -. We• hav<' littl<' doubt that ~ R18 iR 
similarly not so vague that "Ill!'lt of <·ontillOtt llttcllig<'IH'<' 
lllliSt IH'C!'Si'Hl'ily guel'i' at its IIH'Cillillg. " ('OIIII(Iil,lj \ ' 
Uenl'ml Construction ('o .. :.?(i!l {' . ~. :)S,). :301 ( 1\l:.?(i l 
::-1<'<' Gra,IJ!Ifd \' . City of Hockfonl. 40~ l '. ~. 104. 10~ 114 
(l!l72J; Collo11 , .. Kentur·ky. 407 l' . ~. l04 . 110 11i 
( l\l72J; Ca111eron v . • \litcltell , :-3\10 l' ~-till. tilti (HHiR). 
\Vhatev<'r otlwr probk1ns tlH'l'!' ar<-' " ·ith ~ H1H. it ir-; all 
but fri\'(Jlous to suggrst that til<' "<'ctio11 fails to giw 
ackquat<' warlli11gs of ,,·hat H<'t iviti(•s 1t proi"('ribrr-; or 
fail!' to s<'t out "cxpli<'it stalHiards'' for those who must 
apply it. Orayned , .. City of Hockford. supra. at lOR 
111 thr plailtf:'St la11guage. it prohibits an~· statr !'la1:1sifif'd 
<'mploy<'f' frolll being "an officer or 111ember" of a "par.: 
tisan political rlub'' or a caildidatf' for "a11y paid public 
offire.'' lt forbids tlw l"olicitation of rolltributions "for 
any political or11:anization. eandidaey or otlwr politieal 
)Jili')JOSC' .. a11<l th<-' taki11g part "in thE' management or 
affairs of any politi<·al party or 111 Uil:V politi<·al <'arn-
puigii. \Vonb iiH'vitably <·ontain g<'rins of un<'ertalllty . 
hut ~ 81~ is at kal't frf'e of ~twh arnbiguit,v-ladrn tf'rms 
111~ llll<'I :I•~ Ifit ·d JH'l'~O IIIt<'l fn·1· fro111 ~tll·h n ·~ lrll'llon.-. Tl1t· t·oJII!'ll-
1 ioll I ~ ~II IIH'Wil:tl odd Ill I ilr !'Otll('';i of : IJIJIP)lanl~ · Jll'lll!' IJl:l) (•);IIIII . 
11'1111'1! 1~ 1ila1 ~ ,..;1.-.. rc· : lciH·~ loo far I':IIIH·r I han 1101 f:1r !'llollg;h In 
:1 11 ,1' ('1'1'111. IIH· i<ogJ~I:IIIII'(' lllll~l ilHI '(' ~(Jlll(' 11'('11';1,1' Ill dl'i('l'lllllllllg 
llilH·il of It~ ('lllJl]O~'IIH'lll JlO'IIIOll ~ 1'('11'111'(' rc·~II'II'ItOII~ 1111 Jl:ll'lt~ :l ll 
polill<':tl :ll'lll'tiH·~ and 11·hieh 111:1 .1' ht•ldl lllln'glli:ll!'d. :-;,., . . l!tr!ou·wr 
llf!l' ylallll. :wo I ' :-; 4:20 ( 191il) . ..r .'iuwrr11ta11 1· /)ouoa/1. -
( :-; - ( 19/:i). c\JHI :1 :-;1;11!' (';Ill h :1 rdl~ · ill' L11l111'd for :lll!'lllJlllllg 
Ill illllll 1h1• pm<ill<lll ~ IIJlOII 1\hll'h ~tH·h l'C'~Il't!'IIOII~ :11'(' p);I('C'd 
'· Onl .1· 1hr .• lxth :11HI ~l'l'!'lllil parag;r:1ph.• of § ,'oJS :I n' :1t ~~~II(' 111 
1111, 1:111,11 11 fl< •n •Jnafl< 'l'. rd<·n·nc·,·~ lo ~ .-..1.-. •ho11 ld hr lllldl'l'~ lood 
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as "gangster," LanzeUa v. i\'ew Jersey, 30() C :-1 . 4.51 
( 1939), "common 11ight walkers ... Papachrislrru \·. City 
of Jacksonville, 405 P. S. 156 (1972), or "annoying'' COil• 
duct, Coates \'. Cincinnati, 402 e. S. 611 (1971 ). which 
in the past have been held to turn statutes. particularly 
penal statutes. i11tO traps for thC' unwary or for those 
UIIlucky enough to guess wroiigly .: See United State& 
v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 ( 1021); Winters \', 
.\'ew York, 333 U. S .. 507 ( Hl48); Baggett v. Bullitt, 
377 C. S. 360 ( 1964); Palmer" · City of E1.tclid. 402 l'. ~ . 
544 ( 1971). MorC'over. even if the outcrnloRt bound~ 
ariPs of ~ 818 may be imprecise. any such uncertainty 
has little relPvance here. where appellants' conduct falls 
squarely withi11 the "hard core·· of the statutp's pro~ 
scriptions and appellants concede' as much. ' :-lee Dom-
lmJtvski v. Pfister, 380 (T . S . 479. 4!H- 4D2 ( Hl65); [lnited 
Stales Y. Xational Dai·ry Products Corp., 372 r S. 29 
(1963); Williams\' . Uwited States, 341 U. S. 87 (1951) ; 
Robinson \'. United States, 324 U . S. 282. 286 ( 1945) : 
l ' nited Stales \'. Wurzbach, 280 U . S. 306 (1!)30) . 
Shortly before appellants commenced their action i11 
th<' District Court , they were charged by the ~tat<' Per-
sonnel Board with pat<'nt violations of ~ RlH ." Aecord-
1 lt i~ .-igmfi1·nnl in 1ht~ rr~pr1·1 to noll' lhnt § Rll' dor~ no1 cr<':t1r 
:1 ' ·regnlalon· mazt·" wlwn' l·hoHt' ttnrrrtnin mny brl'omn hopdeHsly 
loHt , RPt' Kl'!l-'iliOII , . Board of lle~/CIIts. :1H5 U 8, 5~9 , t\04 (1961) 
Hatlwr. tlw 8tn1L• Prr.-;otmel Board 1~ :t\'tlllnbiP to ruJp 111 ndntnt·t· 
on t h<' pt·rmt.-~ thilll .r of p:1rt H'tdnr eondul't undC'I' thr rxplir1l :; tattd-
:lt'(b :;rt ou1 111 and umltor §I'll'> . S!'P Hrf' . 2:11 Scr Na.tioual A~.~o ­
n atwn of Ll'ti er Carrwrs. ant<'. at -. 
' Tr of Oral .\rg., ~k---Hl 
·• Tlw lh.:tril't Comt unttall~ - n·qtll'~ted th<' partJ<'~ to brid the 
<pt<'H iton ll'hrthN appdhnl" wc•rc' rrqttm•d to t·ompl<•tr tlw Ho:trd'H 
JH'O< '<·Pdnlg" pnor to lmnglllg thl'ir :tl'tlon ttndrr 4:2 l' S C. § l9k:3 
The Bonrd. hO\\'l' I'C'I', on :IJliH'II:Inl,; ' nppltrntJOII . ordt·rPd tiH pro<·r·<·d -
.Jllf!:H ,.:ta.n•d prtHiing; :td.itJdJC'ntton of the fc•drr:tl I'Oll~tJ1Ution:tl qlt(',.: -
1 io.ll.' m 1iw DiHI rict ( 'nur1 WhPn :1ch·1kt'd of I hr Board '" d<·<·t:;Jon , 
:md m 1 h1· ah:;PIJI 'I' of a11~ · oh.wrtJOII>' from appellrrk, thr ])j,.q net 
71-H:i:~9-0PI~TO?\ 
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jng to the Board's chargeR. appl'llants actively partici-
pat<>d i11 the H)70 re-ekctio11 campaign of a Corporation 
('ommissioner. appl'llants· superior. All three allegedly 
asked other Corporation Commission employc0s ( indi-
vidually and in groups) to do campaign work or to give 
rcf<'rrals to perso11S vvho tuight h<'lp in the compaign .. 
Most of these n•quPsts wer<' madP at district offices of 
the Co1mn ission ·~ Oi 1 ttiHI Gas CoiJservation Division . 
T\\O of the appeliants \·VCre charged with soliciting money 
for the campaig11 from ( 'ommission en1ployees and one 
was also charged with reeeivinp; and distributing cam-
paign posters in bulk. In the context of this typC' of 
obviously covered conduct. the statement of Mr. Justice· 
Holmes is particularly ap])]'Ol1riat<' . "if there is any 
difficulty ... it will be time enough to consider it when 
rais('d by sonwo1w whom it concems.'' United States· 
v. Wurzbach, supra, :280 P . ::-l., at 3~Hl . 
Appellants assert that ~ IU8 has been eonstru<'d as 
applying to such allegedly protected political expression 
as the wearing of political buttons or the displaying 
of bumper stickers.'" But appelHmt.s did not engage in 
any such activity. They ar<' ~~ with activelyr n-
gag-illg i~)artisan politieal activities- including the so-
lieitation of tnoney- among th<~ir eo-workers for the bell-
efit of their superior. Appellants eo1wede. as they must 
in light of Letter Car1"iers. ante, that ~ 818 would be con-
stitutional as applied to this type of conduet." Tlwy 
nevertheless 1naintain that the statute' is overbroad and 
Comt ]ll'o<·<•edrd, On tIn~ n·<·ord, WP nC('U nut rott,ld<•r wit('t lwr 
:tppPIJants would lin,·p b('('ll rrqutt'('(l to proc<•Pd to henrin~ lwforc· 
tlw Roard prior to pm,'ilttng tlwir § 198:) artiun . ('1', Gib.w11 v 
Bel'ryhi/1,- ll . S. - , - (1\l/:)): Hart and Weehsler, TIH• F<•<lrral 
( 'omt' nnd Thr Fedrral 1:-l~ · ~t<•m. 9~:)-9~5 (2cl Pd. 197>!) 
1" Th(• Stair l'<•rsoutwl Bo:trd Ita~ ~o intrrprriPd § ~l.S . S<·<· \1Prit 
s~ ·:<tPm of PPr~onnd Admtlll~ll':IIJOn Hulr.- ~ Hi41 : til<' Ro:ml '~ o!l1C'ml 
('irntla r, RrC' . :z:ri 
1
' Tr. of Oral .\rg, -!1-> -4~' -· 
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purports to n·aeh pro1<•ctPd . !lf' wcll as tlllprot<•<·t<•d <'Oil-
duet . a11ct lllll f't thPrdor<• b<> ~trif'k<'ll dom1 011 its fa<·<· 
and lwld to hP IIH'H1><1bk of allY <·o ns1 itutio11al appfica-
tion. \Ve do 110t lwli<'\'<' that thc ov<•rbrcadth doctrill<' 
tnay ap propriai<"ly IH' invokcd in this lllallllN hcn' . 
Emlwdd<•cl i11 tlw traditiot1al rul<·~ govemi11g ronsti-
tutiotlal ncljudicatiotl is tlw pnneiple that a prrso11 to 
whom a statute lllH.V c•ullstitutionall.v bc applicd " ·ill 
110t IH· heard to challrllg<· that statut<' 011 the grou11d that 
it ~Y . c·oJl<'<·ivahly ~ appli<•d tJJH·otlstTtutu)Jla11~· to 
1>ther~ . i 11 otlwr situations 11ot be fun• the C''6Tirt .... . ee. 
~~ . . lustin \'. The Aldermen. 7 \\'all . (i\l4. 6D8 (i90 
(·1X()8): .<..:.uwruisors ' . 8tanll'.IJ. lOt) l '. :-\. :~05. all - :H.C) 
~ iXkl) ; Hatch \'. Reardon. 204 l' . :-1. 1.)2. 1()0 Hil ( 1D07) , 
razoo c\· .\!iss. I 'alley H ' Jackson I 'inyear ('o .. :22() 
l · . ::-:. . :?17. :?l!J- 220 IHH2); ('nited States, .. Wurzbach. 
2XO C. :-1 . :3!Hi. :mo ( 10:30): ('r,.,nichn.el ' Southern Coal 
& Coke Co .. :~01 t '. S. 4~fi ( 19:n); l'nitPd 8tn.les ' 
Haine.<>. :)():2 1' . S. 17 ( HJoO) . A closely related princ1pk l 
is that ron~titutional right~ ar<' pcn;onal and may not 
I><' a~~l'rted ,·icariously . ~<'f' Me Go 1na 11 \' . Maryland , :366 
r. ~ . 420. 4:29- 4:30 (19fHJ . Thf'l'<' prinriplcs rf'st 011 
mon· t ha11 tlw fu~sin<'Sf' of .iudgl'!<. They rcflf'ct tlw ~ ~ 
con\'ietion that under our <'OI1stitutio11al syste1n eourt.s 
::~,n• 110! roving <'OIIIlllissions assignPd to pass .iudgnwnt 
011 til<• \'rtlidity of tlw :\atio11's laws. See }' o·ullyer ' 
Harris. 401 l'. :-1 37 .. 1:2 ( Hl71 l ( 'om:titutional JlHig-
IJWnt:-. a:- ( 'hid Ju!<ticP Mnr:-:;hall r<'eognized. an· JliSll-
fi<'d only out of tlw IIP<'PI-'sity of adjudicating rights 111 
p::trti<·ular <'H~'<'S hPt\\'C'<'n tlw litigHnt~ brought before tilt' 
(\nut 
"So d a lav,: h1• in oppol'liLioll to tlw ronstJtution : 
d' both tlw law and thP <'OIIl'titution apply to a 
particular c·a~<·. so that tlw c·owt lllU::>t eithpr <i<'· 
rirk that c·a:-,p conformably to tlw Ia\\·. disregarding 
riH· c·onstit ution. o1· co11fonnahly to thf' eoustitutio11 
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rlii"rc•garding the law. the eourt tnust determine which 
of these conflicting rules !!:Overns the case. This is 
of the very esset1ee• of judieial duty." Marbury \' . 
Mndiso'll, 1 Cranch 1a7. 177 (1803) . 
In the past, the Court has recognized some IImitPd 
c•xc<>ptions to these principh•s. but only because of thP 
most "weighty countc•rvailing policies." (' nited 8lates 
\'. Raines, supra, 3():l l". :-1 .. at '22-~3.'" On<> such e>.-
ceptwn is where individuals 110t parties to a parttcular 
slllt Btand to lose by its outcotne and yet have• 110 effective> 
ave'nue of preserving thc•ir rtl!:hts themselves. ~ee E1.Se ll -
8tadt v. Baird, 405 l". :-1. 43H. 444-44() ( Hl72) ; .YAA Cf-1 
v . . llabama, 357 l' . :-;_ 44\J ( 1958) . Anotlwr exception 
has been carved out 111 the• ar<>a of the First Amendment .. 
It has long been rpcogn.ized that tlw First Amend-
lllPilt ueeds breathing space and that statutes attempttng 
to restrict or burdC'n tlw e•xel'lcse of First Ame•ndment 
rights must be narrowly drawn and repre~wnt a cotlSJdt>recl 
legislative judgment that a parttcular rnod<' of expression 
has to give way to otlwr con1pelling tlePds of socic·ty 
Her11don v. Loll'ry , :~01 C. :-;_ 253. :Z58 ( 1937); 8helto11 
\'. Tucker, 364 C. :-1. 47\J. 488 ( 1060 J; Gray ned v. City 
of Hockford, supra, 40X r . :-1 .. at 116- 117. As a corollary. 
tlw ('ourt has altc'rPd its traditional rules of standing 
to pC'rtllit- in the First AmC'ndment area-"attacks 011 
ovc•rly broad statutPs " ·ith no requin•JtH.'nt that the IWr-
sotl tnaking tlH• attack dc•tnotlstratP that his ow11 con-
duct eoulcl not lw n•gt!latecl by a statute drawn w1th 
tlH· n•quisite SJW<'ifieity." /)ull~iJrou,ski v Pfister. 3HO 
l'. :-1 . 47!J. 4~6 ( 1!lo5J. Litigant~. thcrefon'. are I>C'rmittPd 
to challpnge a statute 110t hpeause thC'ir ow11 rights of 
' " ~<'<' gt·rH·r:dl~·. Hal'l and Vi't·('hsl('l' , ~upra. at 11'+-:21-L tlPdl(•r. 
:-ltandrng to .\,<,.;Prt C'on~trtutlonal .Ju" Tntn 111 thr Supn•nw ('ourt , 
i 1 Yal<' L .J 5!!!1 ( 191"\:!) : ~ol<'. Th<• Flr~t Anwndnwnl Ovrrlm·adt h 
Dot·tl'lnt• . s:l Uan·, L HP\", q..J (HI701 , 
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fr(•<• expn•ssio11 an• violated, but beeause of a judiciai 
prPdiction or assUinption that the statute's very exist-
ence may cause oth<'rs not before the court to refra!n 
from constituti<mally proteet<·d spe<~ch or expression . 
. :-luch claims of facial ov<•rbreadth have been enter-
.tained in cas<•s itlv~ut<~s which. by their terms, 
R<:ek to regul~tP ~ "oply SJ>ok<• tt words.,. Gooding v. Wil--
son. 401) U. :-1. 51i-\. 52() ( 197:2). :-1<'<' CoJ,en v. California, 
40:3 r. :-;, l;) 11971); 8treet \ . . \'ew )'ork, 394 U.S. 576 
( Hl6~J); Hrandenbur!J v. Uln'o, :105 r. S. 444 (196.9); 
Clwpl·insk:y \ . . \ .eu• Ha111psln:rc. 315 C. S. 568 (1942) . 
I 11 suclt cas<'S. it has been the judgnwnt of this Court 
that thP possible harm to sociPty i11 permitting some 
Uitprotected spPech to go unpunished is far outweighed 
by the possibility that protected spet>ch of others may be 
muted and JWrceived gri<•vatlC<'S left to fester because of 
the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statuteb. 
Overb. readth attacks have also bee. ll allowed where the~ 
('ourt thought rights of association were ensnared in 
statutes which . by their broad swe<~p. might result in 
burdening innocent associations. See Keyshian v. Board 
of R egents, :18.) 1'. ~- ;)R$l ( HHi7); U nded States v. Robel . 
:1Rtl U. :-1. 25R (1967); .-lptheker v. Secretary of State . 
:i7R C :-; , 000 ( 1964 J; Shelton v. Tucker, supra. Fac·ial 
overbreadth claims have also been consistently e11 L<·r- ~~ 
taitwd when• statutes. by their terms. purport to r<'!!;ll- ! 
late the time. place and manner of expressive or eotn-
lllUilicative conduct, see Gra:yned v. City of Rockfnl'd. 
408 F. S. 104, 114- 121 ( 1972) ; Cameron v . .! oli nson . 
:3!10 P . S. 611. 617- 619 (1968); Zwickler v. Kootn . 3X!l 
( ' :-; _ 241.:249- 250 (1967l; Thornhill v. Alabnma. :no 
tT :-1 . R8 (1940). and where such conduct ha:-: r<·quir<'d 
official approval under Ia ws that delegated stat1dardh•s:-: 
rli sc r<'tionary pom•r to local functionari es. resulting 111 
virtually um·evi<'wablP prior restraittts 011 First .\tttt'IHI-
ment rights :-ieP 8huttlesu>orth \' BiTining/,run , :~\14 
IIIII.,.. 
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P . S. 147 (l!:lf\9); C'o.r , .. Louisimw, 3n) U. ~. 5:36. 5.)3 
558 ( 1D65); Kuuz " · Xew rork, 340 P. ~ . 2~JO ( 1051) , 
Lovell , .. Griffin, 303 r. ~. 444 (1938) . 
Tlw consequrnce of our departure fro111 traditional 
rulrs of standing in th<' First Amendment arras is that 
any Pnforcement of a statutP thus placed at if-'Sll<' 1::-, 
totally forbidden until and u11less a limiting <'O ilStructiUII 
or partial Invalidation so 11arrows It as to n'll10I'<' th<·· 
seeming thrrat or dPterr<'IW<' to constJtutio11ally pro-
tectrd exprPssiOil. Applicatio11 of the oV<'rbn·adth do<'-
trinP in this mailller is. Inanif<'stly. strong medicllll' . It 
has brt•n t>mployt'd by tlw ( 'ourt spanngly a11d o11ly a:-; 
a last resort. Facial overlm·adth has not lw<>ll lllVOk<'d 
11·hen a limitlllg construction has been or could lw plact>d 
on tlw challenged statute. ~er Dombrowski 1 . Pfister . 
supra, 380 l ' . ~ .. at 4!H; Co:r , .. . \'ew fla111pshire, 312 
F. S. 56!J ( 1941); United Slates v. Thirty-Seven f>fwto-
r;raphs, 402 U. S. 363 ( 1971) ~ cf. Breard v. Ale.mndrw .. 
341 U. S. 622 ( 1951 ). Equally important. ov<'rur<'adth 
claims. if rntrrtained at all. have been curtailPd wlwn 
mvoked against ordinary cnmlllal laws that an' sought 
to lw appli<'d to protrcteu eoncluct. ln CaultN'll 1 . ('ou 
neclicul, 310 C. S. 2~)fj ( 1940) . Jesse Cantwt>ll. a J<·hovah ·s 
\Y i tn<'ss. was COil \'Ieted of colllmon Ia \\' br<"ach uf tlH• 
]WaC'P for playillg 3 phonograph rc•conl attacking the 
Catholic Church bdor<' two Catholic Ill<'ll on a :'\<'\\ 
Ha.v<'n strrct. The Court reversed Calltw<'ll's convict1on \ 
but only 011 tlw ground that his conduct. "(•unsicl<'r<'d 111 
1 igh t of th<' constitu tiona] guarantees... could not b<· 
puni~lwd under "the common law off<'lli"<' 111 qupstion ." 
/d .. at 311 ( footnot<' omittrd ). Th<' Court did not hold 
that th e offl'llSf' ''known as breach of th<· [Wace " must 
fall w tolo becausP It was capablr of sonH' unconstJtu-
tional applications. and. 111 fact. tlw Court ~erming]y 
envisioned its continued use against "a great variety ol 
conduct d<'stroying or mf'nacing pub!Jc ordrr and tra11 -. 
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t]uilty.' ' ld. , at 308. SeP International Brother/wad of 
Tea111sters, Lowl 69.5 , .. \'out, :104 l'. S. 284 ( 1057), 
Oar11er , .. Lou?siana, :3ti8 C S. 157. 20:2- 203, 205 ( 19()1) 
(Harlan .. J .. concurring). Similarly. in revi<'\\·ing til(' 
statutory breach of the peace convictio11s invo]v('d i11 
Edu•ards , .. South Carolina, :)72 lT. S. 2:29 (10('\:)). aud 
Co.r \'. Louisiana. 37D t'. S. 536. 544-.5;)2 (1!J65). the 
Cot1rt eonsickred in <ktail the Stat('·s evidenc<' and . i1i 
t'aeh case ('OIJCluded that tlH' eonduct at issue could q(>t 
be pu11ishcd under 11 breach of the 1wace statute. 011 
that basis. the eOilvictiollS \·Vt'r<' reversed.' ' Additio11ally , 
i>vt>rbrPadth scrntiny has generally lwcn somewhat less 
rigid i11 the context of statutes regulating conduct in thf! 
shadow of the First Ame11dme11t, but doing so in a lll'll-
tral. uoncPnsorial manuer. S0e Cnited Stntes ' C 10 . 
:)35 1' . 1'1. 106 ( l\J48); l'111.ted States v. Harriss, :~47 l '. S. 
612 ( 19.54); R ed Lio11 Brondwsting ('o. , .. FCC, :3~)5 ( 1• ,..; , 
;357 ( 106\l); cf. Vickerinr; \' . Board of Education, 301 
U.S. 563. 565 11 . 1 ( 1968); Eastern R . Conference"· .\ 'oerr 
Motor Frei{;ht, Inc., 365 l '. S. ( Hl!i1 J 
It remains a ''nwttPr of 110 little· difficulty " to d<'tf'r- } 
mine wht>n a Jaw may properly lw held void on its faee 
and ,\'lwn "sueh summary aetion ·· i:-; i11appropriat,e, 
Coa.{es v. ('inc in 11ati. supra. at 617 (separate opinion of 
Blade. .J. ). But the• plain import of 011r cases is. at the 
Vf' I'Y least . that facial overbreadth ad,iudieati011 II'; a11 ex·-
ception to our traditional rtil<>s of praeLit<' and that tts 
' " 1 n hot h li'rlu·orrl8 and ( 'u.r f . at tlw wr~ · <'IKI of t liP dl~l'tl ~~iu n~ . 
thr Court abo notPd that tlw ~tat 11tr~ wonk! b1• l':tCiidly unron~ tlttl -
1ional for o\'t•rbnwlth. tlr<· :{7:.? l l. S .. Ht :2:li' : :)7\:) l 1 S., at 551 
552 ln ('u.r I . tiw ('ourt termPd thl~ dt~('ll~~~on nn "adchtlollal 
rea~OII .. for 1t' I'P\'Pr~al. :)'iH l' S. at 55:2 ThiN' "addi1JOI1:il 
holdJliQ> w<·n· lllll11't'<'~~nr.v to I he di~J!O~I1Jol1' of till' <·a~<·~, ~o tlltlch 
~o thnt onl\· ol1<' \l<·nil>l'r of t!JJ, Co ttrt rplwd 1111 ( 'u.r·~ "a dclit io nal '' 
holding in /Jruu ·11 \'. l-uuisw11a. :li':; 1· :-..; 1:)1 (1\)(i(i), wh1rh Jli\ 'OI\'t•cl 
ro nvil'l'lon' und<·r ilw v•·n· .-•anw hrl'al'h of tiw p•·a<'l' ~tnt tit< ' t:i<'<' 
£r/ ., ;(t 14:)- [f)() ( BHJ.: N NA 0,:: , ,J , <'()IIGilJ'J11J!l:) o 
'il-lii:~0-0Pl~l0 .-
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functio ll. a limJt<>d Oil<' at the outs<•t. att<•nuaw~ a~ tiH· 
hrhaYior tlw ~tat<' is forbidd<•n to sanction mov<'s fnHn 
"pun• ~ .. to\\"ards eondtJct and that conduct- PvCil if 
<'X]H'<'SI"ivC'-falls \Yithin th<· S('(J ]W of otlwrwist' va iJd 
rrimi na l Ia ,,·s that rc>fiert legi tunat<' !'>tat<' i ntt•r<·stf: 111 
maintaini11g <·oJll]H'<'IH'ItSiV<' colttrolf: over hanuful. roll · 
i'itJtutioJwlly unprott•ct<'d <'Oitduct .\!though i"Uch lam .. . 
Jf' too broadly ,,·orrkd . lltay dPtr>r prot<'<'t<'cl i'i]l<'<'<'h t <' 
som<· unkii0\\.11 <'Xt<'nt. tlt<'r<· c·oJll<'s a point ,,·hpn• tl1at 
l'f"l'<•et at IH'st a pn·dictJOJl <·aJtiiOt . w1tl1 c·olltid<•JH'<' 
.lllstify i1tvalidating a statui<· 011 it~ fa<·c· a11d so pro 
hibi ti ng a ~tat(' front c•Jlforclllg tlw statu t<• against con ~ 
duct that il' acllnitt<•clly within 1ts powc>r to pror::crilw 
('f .1/denl/(l/1 , . r·111·/ed Slales . :3D4 l". ~ Ui.) . 174 17.) 
( H)()!l ). To put tiH· Jnatt<•r anoth<'r way. partJCtilarly 
\\'h<·n· <:Otlduet and not m<•n·ly spee<·h IS lltvolvt•d. ,,.p. 
bc·lievP that tlw overbreadth of a statut<• must nut only 
lw rc·al. but substantial as \H•Il. JUdged in n•latJOil to tlw 
statute 's plai1tly legitJJnat<• 13W<'<'Jl. It 1s our VH'\\' that 
~ ~IX is not substantially overbroad at HI that \\'haL<'vt•J · 
ov<•rhreadth 1nay exist should I)(' cur<'d through cas<'-hy 
eas<' analysif:' of the fac·t :-;ltuations to \\hich 1ts saJJ<'t!Oil". I 
Hsl'<'rtPclly . I nay not IH' appiH•d 
l ' 1tlikc· orc!Inary br<'a<:h of th<· ]H'at<> statut<•s ur otht•J 
broad r('gulatory acts. ~ I:H~ is din•et<'d. by ltl' tPnns. at 
politiC'al ('XI))'<'f.:sion \\'h]('h if <'ngag<·d 111 by pnvat(• ]H'r-
solts \\'OUld phunly b<' protr>ct<•d by tlw First a1HI Four 
ll'<'nth AnH•JJ(]Ilwnts. But at tlw sallH' tJlllP, ~ ~18 tl' 
11ot a <'<' lt t:~orial statut<'. dir<·<'tPd at parti<·ular group:- or 
VIC'\\ pmnts. ('f. Key:>liian ,. Boord of Heyen/8, supra . 
Tlw statut<' . rather. speks to n'gulat<• politi<·al a<'tivJty f/ 
111 an <'\'<'11-hall<kd and IH•utral lllallllPr . .\s 1ndieated . ~ 1 
such ::;tatutt•s have 111 tlH• past l)('eti Sttb.wet to a IPs" 
<'Xa<'tlltg overlm•adth serutiny :Ylon·ovl'l'. tlw fact re 
mnin!ol that ~ Hl8 regulat<'~" a. f:'ltbstallttal speC'tru1n of 
7J-Hi~9-0Pl::\JO . 
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t:(!llduct that is as ma1ufestly sub.wet to stat<' re~~;ulation 
as the public peacr or cnminal trespass. Th1s much \\'aR 
rstablished i11 ( 'm'ted Public Workers v. il-filthell, and 
has been unheasitati11gly rraffinned today 111 Detter Car-
riers, ante. Fndrr thr decision in Letter CMriers, tlwrP 
is no qu<>stion that ~ 818 is valid at least Insofar as It 
forbids classified rmployees front . sol!cJtinl-{ contribu ~ 
tJOilS for partisan candidat<·s. political parties . or otlH'I' 
partisa 11 politieal purposes ; becom1 Ill!, nwmlwrr:: of na 
tJOili:ll. stat<'. or lo<·al eom1nittces of polJtH·al partH'S. Ol' 
officNs or <·ommJtt<'<' Inembt•rs 111 partisan political club~ . 
or candidates to any paid publie office; taking part 111 tlw 
managellH'Ilt or affairs of any political party 's parW;a11 
political eampaign, SC'rvlllg as dcl<'gat<'S or altemat<'fo; to 
caucus<'s or <'Oilventions of polit1eal part1es; addressilllf 
o1· taking a11 activr part Ill partisan pohtiC'al rallies or 
11wetmgs; soliciting vot<'s or ass1sti1lg voters at th<' pull~ 
or helping lll a partisan pffort tu grt voters at the polls . 
partwipati11g 111 the distributiOn of partlSall campaign 
literature ; initiating or Circulating partisan llOilllnatinl!. 
pNitions; or riding 111 carava11S for any polltwal party or 
partisan political <'UIHilda l< ' 
Tlws<' proscriptiOns arc· tak<•n dm•<·tly from the <·OJI -
tested paragraphs of~ ~lH. till' Rules of the :-ltate P<'rSOIJ -
n<'l Board. and tlw authoritative opinions of the :-ltatr 
A ttompy U<•neral. \Vi thout q uest1on . tlw cond lH't a p- 1~ 
jWJlantS have bf'Pil chal'g('d With fall s SqUarc-•ly \\'Ithlll f 
tlwsP proscnptwn:s 
Apprllants assrn that ~ Xl~ go<'s much farther than 
thPs<' prohibitions. According to appcllants. tlH· stat-
u tc 's prohibitwns arc• not tied ttgh tly enough to part is an 
polit1cal <·onduct and impermissibly r<'lcgat<' <'lllployces 
to <'xprPssing their political VJ<'ws '' pnvately. " The :-\tat<· 
Pt'rsonnrl Board. howc>ver. has construed ~ iHX's t•xp!Jcit 
approval of " privatP" politwal <'Xpr<>sswn tu tncludP 
il- ltJ:l9- (l l'lNIO?\ 
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virtually any cxpi'('ssioll 110t within the context of active 
partisa11 political campaigning.'' anu the State 's Attorney 
G(•neral, in plain t(•rms, ha~ interpreted ~ 818 as pro-
hibiting "clearly partisan political activity'' only."' 
~urely a court cannot be expected to ignore these au-
thoritative proJwunceJH('IltS in determining tbe breadth 
of a state ~tatut<'. Appellants further point to the 
Board's interpretiv<' rulPs purporting to restrict such al-
legedly protPcted activities as the wearing of political 
buttons or the use of bumper stickers. It may be that 
such restrictions are in1permisible and that the ~ 818 
may be susceptible- of som<· other improper applications. 
But as prese11tly co11strued. v,:e do not believe that ~ 81~ 
must be discarded in loto because some persons' arguably 
protected conduct may or may not be caught or chilled 
by the statute. ~ectiOil 1-\18 is not substantially over-
broad a1HI is not. therefore, unconstitutional Oll its facf\ . 
ThP judgme11t of the District Court is affirmed . 
It is su ordered. 
'' Thr Board '., lllt<'rprrtn·c· r1n·ular ~tatr~ (Rrr . :2:37): 
"Tiw nght. to l'Xpn·~~ pol1t ic·~il OJllltlon~ i~ rr~rrved to all ~uch pPr-
~on~. ~oi· r: Tl11~ re~<·rvntion ~~ H~lh.it·c·t to thr prohibition that ~uch 
p< ' tNJtJ~ 111:1~ · not tnkP :tl't i\'(• part 111 political managcm<•nt ur Ill 
polt t 1 en! <'am p:ugu~ " 
'''Opinion of tit<• AttonH·_,. (:rll(•ntl, ~o . 6S-:351i. p. :2 ( 191iii) 
Tltr Di~tt'll't ( 'omt ,;i milariY mtrrpr<'tf'd § 81/i a~ tntt•ndmg to pt•rmtt 
puhltc Pxprr.,~IOII~ of political opul!on .. ~o long a~ t hl' Ptnplo~·<'<' doe' 
not rhannrlln- acttYil\' toward~ part~ · ~urcr~~-" :nk F. Supp. ill . 
/Hi Althonglt thr ('ourt\ t.nt<·rprctatton lei obv1ou~l~· not b1nding 
on ,;tnt<' :tltthontJC'"· ." <'<' Cnited State~; , ._ Tfnrty-,'ie ve ll fJfwtoornfih~;. 
-!0:2 l'. S. :m:l. :-lf\9 ( 1911). a frdf'ral l'ollrt mt1"t <ktt' l'ffiiiH' wlwt a 
~ tat<' ~tntut<· mf•:tn~ hf'i'<>rr it c·an .iudgl' II.-' fnc1:tl con,tittltlonallt:. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
.§n.pumt ~curl cf tltt ~nittb .§ta±t.s 
~ht.sfringt~ ~. ~· ' 2tlpJ.1.;1 
May 30, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1639 - Broadrick v. Oklahoma 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
r)J/"V' 
Mr. Justice White 





JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.iu:vrttttt ~ourt of tqt ~nittb j;Pttts 
~:tilrhtg!ott. ~. ~· :!ilgtJt~ 
June 1, 1973 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No. 71-1639 Broadrick v. Oklahoma 
No. 72-634 U.S. Civil Service Commission 
v. National Letter Carriers, etc. 
I shall circulate dissents in these two cases in 
due course. 
. , 
' '. . 
W. J. B. Jr • 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
June 4, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1639 - Broadrick v. Oklahoma 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
;§u:puntt ~onrl uf tqt 'Jltttittb ~ta:tts 
Jfasfrhtght~ !B. OJ. zn.;;'1~ 
June 6, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1639 .. William M. Broadrick, et al v. State of 
Oklahoma, et a1 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your fine opinion in the above case. 
I will try to resist the temptation to add a hearty "Amen" in 
concurrence. 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
SUPREtvlE COUlU OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 71-1639 To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Just~ce Douglas 
Mr. Justice Ste1·:art 
/ 
William M. Broadrick et al., 
Appellants, 
:Mr. ,T'J.tru&pl\fftfifu from the United 
:Mr. Just$1t@ti~:Psllii~trict Court 
y. 
State of Oklahoma et al. 
[June , 1973] 
Mr. JustftW:"Btbe:-m\it:Istern District 
""'f.!r. JustdXfe (J)b.~l}oma. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
From: Brennan, J. 
Circulated: 
Recirculated: 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting: 
Whatever one's view of the desirability or constitutionality 
of legislative efforts to restrict the political activities of 
government employees, one must regard today's decision upholding 
§ 818 of the Oklahoma Merit System of Personnel Administration 
Act _1_/ as a wholly unjustified retreat from fundamental and 
previously well-established First Amendment principles. For 
the purposes of this decision, the Court assumes--perhaps 
even concedes--that the statute at issue here sweeps too 
broadly, barring speech and conduct that are constitutionally 
protected even under the standards announced in United Public 
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 u.s. 75 (1947), and reiterated today 
in United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association 
of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, ante, p. Nevertheless, the 
Court rejects appellants' contention that the statute is 
·~ 
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unconstitutional on its face, reasoning that "where 
conduct and not merely speech is involved, ... the over-
breadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial 
as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly 
legitimate sweep. It is our view that § 818 is not 
substantially overbroad and that whatever overbreadth may 
exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact 
situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be 
applied." Ante, at That conclusion finds no support in 
previous decisions of this Court, and it effectively overrules 
our decision just tw·o Terms ago in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 
402 U.S. 611 (1971). I remain convinced that Coates was 
correctly decided, and I must therefore respectfully dissent. 
As employees of the Corporation Commission of the State 
of Oklahoma, a state agency, appellants are subject to the 
provisions of the State's Merit Act. That Act designates 
certain state agencies, including the Corporation Commission, 
I 
which are barred from dismissing or suspending classified 
employees for political reasons. At the same time, the Act 
authorizes the State Personnel Board to dismiss or suspend any 
.. ,. ' 
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classified employee who engages in certain· prohibited political 
activity. Although specifically protecting an employee's right 
"as a citizen privately to express his opinion and to cast 
his vote," the Act bars (1) fund-raising for any political 
purpose; (2) membership in any national, state, or local 
committee of a political party or a political club; (3) 
candidacy for any public office; and (4) participation in the 
"management or affairs of any political party or in any · 
political campaign." 
As a result of appellants' alleged participation in the 
1970 re-election campaign of Corporation Commissioner Ray c. 
Jones, the State Personnel Board formally charged appellants 
with violations of the Act. Appellants then ~rought this 
action under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 before a three-judge Federal 
District Court in the Western District of Oklahoma, seeking 
an injunction against enforcement of the Act, The District 
Court rejected appellants' contentions that the Act is 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, arid the Court today 
affirms that determination. 
Appellants First Amendment claims are, of course, similar 
Page 4 
to the vagueness and overbreadth contentions rejected by the 
Court today in upholding§ 9(a) of the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 7324(a)(2). See National Association of Letter Carriers, 
ante, p. ___ . But that decision, whether or not correct, is 
by no means controlling on the questions now before us. 
Certain fundamental differences between the Hatch Act and 
the Oklahoma Herit Act should, at the outset, be made clear. 
Section 9(a) of the Hatch Act provides that a federal 
government employee may not "(1) use his official authority 
or influence for the purpose of interfering . with or affecting 
the result of an election; or (2) take an active part in 
political management or in political campaigns." Although 
recognizing that the meaning of the Act's critical phrase, 
"an active part in political management or in political 
campaigns," is hardly free from ambiguity, the Court concluded 
that the term could be defined by reference to a complex 
network of Civil Service Commission regulations developed over 
many years and comprehens,ively restated in 1970. See 
5 C.F.R. Part 733. Those regulations make clear that among the 
I 
rights retained by a federal employee, notwithstanding the 
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arguably contrary language of the statute, are the rights to 
"[e]xpress his opinion as an individual privately and 
publicly on political subjects and candidates;" to "[d]isplay 
a political picture, sticker, badge, or button;" to "[b]e 
a member of a political party or other political organization 
; " and to "[m]ake a financial contribution to a 
political party or organization." 5 C.F.R. § 733.111. 
By contrast, the critical phrase of the Oklahoma ~ct-­
no employee shall "take part in the management or affairs 
of any political party or in any political campaign"--
is left almost 'vholly undefined. \.Vhile the Act does 
specifically declare that employees have the right to 
express their views "in private," it nowhere defines the 
terms "take part" or "management" or "affairs." The 
reservation of the right to express one's views in private 
could, moreover, be thought to mean that any public expression 
of views is forbidden. Of course, the Oklahoma Act can, like 
its federal counterpart, be viewed in conjunction with the 
applicable administrative regulations. But in marked contrast 
with the elaborate set of regulations purporting to define the 
Page 6 
prohibitions of the Hatch Act, the pertinent regulations of 
the State Personnel Board are a scant five rules that shed 
no light at all on the intended reach of the statute. Two 
of those rules merely recite the language of the Act. __ 2_/ 
A third offers no more specific guidance than the general 
exhortation that a classified employee shall "pursue the common 
good, and, not only be impartial, but so act as neither to 
endanger his impartiality nor to give occasion for distrust of 
his impartiality." __ 3_/ A fourth provides that a classified 
employee must resign his position "prior to filing as a 
candidate for public office, seeking or accepting nomination 
for election or appointment as an official of a political 
party"--again, merely tracking the language of the Act. _!]_/ 
The fifth, far from clarifying or limiting the scope of the 
Act, provides the major thrust to appellants' overbreadth 
contention. The rule declares that "[a]n employee in the 
classified service may not wear a political padge, button, 
or similar partisan emblem, nor may such employee display a 
partisan political sticker or sign on an automobile operated 
by him or under his control." _2_/ Even the Court concedes 
·, . 
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that a ban on the wearing of buttons or the display of 
bumper stickers may be "impermissible." Ante, at 
It is possible, .of course, that the inherent ambiguity 
of the Oklahoma statute might be cured by judicial construction 
of its terms. But the Oklahoma Supreme Court has never 
attempted to construe the Act or narrow its apparent reach. 
Plainly, this Court cannot undertake that task. Gooding v, 
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972); United States v. Thirty-Seven 
~ Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971). I must assume, therefore, 
that the Act, MM8R subject to whatever gloss is provided by 
_:]__/ 
the ~dministrative regulations, is capable of applications 
that would prohibit speech and conduct clearly protected by 
the First Amendment, Even on the assumption that the statute's 
regulatory aim is permissible, the manner in which state power 
is exercised is one that unduly infringes protected freedoms. 
Shelton v. Tucker, 36~ U.S. 479, 489 (1960); Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 u:s. 296, 304 (1940), The State has failed, 
in other words, to provide the necessary "sensitive tools" to 
carry out the "Sf3paration of legitimate from illegitimate speech." 
Page 8 
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958). See NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). 
Although the Court does not expressly hold that the 
statute is vague and overbroad, it does assume not only that 
the ban on the wearing of badges and buttons may be "impermissible," 
but also that the Act "may be susceptible of some other 
improper applications." Ante, at __ . Under principles that 
I had thought established beyond dispute, that assumption 
requires a finding that the statute is unconstitutional on its 
1 face. Ordinarily, "one to whom application of a statute is 
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on 
the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying 
to other persons or other situations in which its application 
might be· unconstitutional." United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 
17, 21 (1960).~ And it is conceded, it would seem, that the 
State could prohibit appellants' conduct without infringing 
the guarantees of the First Amendment. Nevertheless, we have 
repeatedly recognized that "the transcendent value to 
all society of constitutionally protected expression 
is deemed to justify allowing 'attacks on 




overly lJroad stat utes with no requirement that ·the person 
making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not 
he regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow 
specificity.'" Gooding v. Wilson, supra, at 521, gxgiH~ quoting 
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 
.!1 
(1965). We have 
adhered to that view because the guarantees of the First 
Amendment are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely 
precious in our society. The threat of sanctions may deter 
their exercise almost as potently as the. actual application 
of sanctions. Cf. Smith v. California, [361 u.s. 147, 151-
154 (1959)]." NAACP v. Button, supra, at 432-433. The 
mere .existence of a statute that sweeps too broadly in areas 
protected by the First Amendment "results in a continuous 
and pervasive restraint on all freedom of discus sion that 
might reasonably be regarded as within its purview. . . . 
Where regulations of the liberty of free discussion are 
concerned, there are S.Pecial reasons for observing the rule 
that it is the statute, and not the accusation of the evidence 
under it, which prescribes the limits of permissible conduct 
and warns against transgression." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 
4 
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U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940). See Note, The First Amendment 
Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv. L. Rev, 844, 853-854 (1970), 
Although the Court declines to hold the Oklahoma Act 
unconstitutional on its face, it does expressly recognize 
that overbreadth review is a necessary means of preventing 
a "chilling effect" on protected expression. Nevertheless, 
the Court reasons that the function of the doctrine "attenuates 
as the behavior the State is forbidden to sanction moves from 
'pure speech' towards conduct and that conduct--even if 
expressive--falls within the scope of otherwise valid 
criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in 
maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally 
unprotected conduct," Ante, at Where conduct is involved, 
a statute's overbreadth must henceforth be "substantial" 
before the statute can properly be found invalid on its face. 
I cannot accept the validity of that analysis, In the 
first place, the Court makes no effort to define what. it 
means by "substantial overbreadth." We have never held that 
a statute should be held invalid on its face merely because it is 




that sense a requirement of substantial overbreadth is already 
implicit in the doctrine. Cf. Notte, The First Amendment Over-
breadth Doctrine, supra, at :858-860, 918. Whether the Court 
means to require some different or greater showing of substantiality 
is left obscure by today's opinion, in large part because 
the Court makes no effort to explain why ·the overbreadth 
of the Oklahoma Act, while real, is somehow not quite 
substantial. No more guidance is provided than the Court's 
conclus0ry assertion that appellants' showing here falls 
belO\v the line. 
More fundamentally, the Court offers no rationale to 
expl~in its conclusion that, for purposes of overbreadth 
analysis, deterrence of conduct should be viewed differently 
from deterrence of speech, even where both are equally 
protected by the First Amendment. Indeed, in the case before 
us it is hard to knO\v whether the protected activity falling 
within the Act should .be considered speech or conduct. In any 
case, the conclusion that a distinction should be drawn was 
the premise of MR. JUSTICE WHITE's dissenting opinion in 
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 620-621 (1971), . ' 
and that conclusion--although squarely rejected in Coates--has 
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now been adopted by the Court. 
At issue in Coates was a city ordinance making it an 
offense for "three or more persons to assemble . . • on any 
of the sidewalks . . .. and there conduct themselves in a 
manner annoying to persons passing by • " There can . . . 
be no doubt that the ordinance was held unconsti.tutinnal 
on its face, and not merely unconstitutional as applied to 
particular, protected conduct. For the Court expressly noted 
that the ordinance was "aimed directly a~ activity protected 
by the Constitution. We need not lament that we do not have 
before us the details of the conduct found to be annoying. It 
is the ordinance on its face that sets the standard of donduct 
and warns against transgression. The details of the offense 
could no more serve to validate this ordinance than could the 
details of an offense charged under an ordinance suspending 
unconditionally the right of assembly and free speech." 402 
U.S., at 616. In dissent, MR. JUSTICE WHITE maintained that 
since the ordinance prohibited persons from "assembling and 
'conduct[ing]' themselves in a manner annoying to other persons," 
he would "deal with the Cincinnati ordinance as we would ~ 
·, .. .' 
.~. 
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with the ordinary criminal statute. The ordinance clearly 
reaches certain conduct but may be illegally vague with respect 
to other conduct. The statute is not infirm on its face and 
since we have no information on this record as to what conduct 
was charged against these defendants, we are in no position to 
judge the statute as applied. That the ordinance may confer 
wide discretion in a wide range of circumstances is irrelevant 
when we may be dealing with conduct at its core," 402 U.S., 
at 620-621. Thus, Coates stood, until today, for the proposition 
1 that where a statute is "unconstitutionally broad because it 
authorizes the punishment of constitutionally protected conduct," 
402 U.S., at 614, it must be held invalid on its face whether 
or not the person raising the challenge could have been 
.1V 
prosecuted under a properly narrowed statute. The Court 
makes no attempt to distinguish Coates, implicitly conceding 
that the decision has been overruled. 
At this stage, it is obviously difficult to estimate the 
probable impact of tod.ay's decision. If the requirement of 
"substantial" overbreadth is construed to mean only that 
facial review is inappropriate where the likelihood of an 
impermi~sib~e application of the statute i s too small to generate 
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a "chilling effect" on protected speech or conduct, then the 
impact is likely to be small. On the other hand, if today's 
decision necessitates the drawing of artific~al distinctions 
between protected speech and protected conduct, and if the 
"chill" on protected conduct is rarely, if ever, found 
sufficient to require the facial invalidation of an overbroad 
statute, then the effect could be very grave indeed. In 
my view, the principles set forth in Coates v. City of Cincinnati 
are essential to the preservation and en.forcement of the 
First Amendment guarantees. Since no subsequent development 
has persuaded me that the principles are ill-founded or that 
Coates was incorrectly decided, I would reverse the judgment 
of the District Court on the strength of that decision,and 
hold the Oklahoma l'1erit Act unconstitutional on its face. 
FOOTNOTES 
!/ Okla. Stat. Ann. § 818 provides in ~ertinent part: 
"No employee in the classified service, and no member of 
the Personnel Board shall, directly or indirectly, solicit, 
receive, or in any manner be concerned in soliciting or 
receiving any assessment, subscription or contribution 
f~r any political organization, candidacy or other 
political purpose; and no state officer or state employee 
in the unclassified service shall solicit or receive 
any such assessment, subscription OJ; contribution from 
an employee in the classified service. 
"No employee in the classified service shall be a member 
of any national, state or local committee of a political 
par~y, or an officer or member of a committee of a partisan 
political club, or a candidate for nomination or election 
to any paid public office, or shall take part in the 
management or affairs of any political party or in any 
political campaign, except to exercise his rights as a 
citizen privately to express his opinion and to cast 
his vote," 
FN-2 
£/Oklahoma State Personne l Board Rule 1630 (1971)1 
"No employee in the classified service, and no 
member of the Personnel Board shall, directly or 
indirectly, . solicit, receive, or in any manner be 
concerned in soliciting or receiving any assessment, 
subscription or contribution for any political 
organization, candidacy or other political purpose; 
and no state officer or state employee in the 
unclassified service shall solicit or receive any 
such assessment, subscription or contribution from 
an employee in the classified service." 
Rule 1640 provides: 
"No employee in the classified service shall be a 
member of any national, state or local committee of 
a political party, or an officer or member of a 
committee of a partisan political club or a candidate 
for nominati~n or election to any paid public office, 
' or shall take part in the management or affairs of any 
political party or in any political campaign, except to 
exercise his right as a citizen privately to express 
FN-3 
his opinion and to cast his vote." 
Compare note 1 supra. 
d_l Rule 1625 provides: 
"Every classified employee shall fulfill to the 
best of his ability the duties of the office of 
position conferred upon him and shall prove 
himself in his behavior, inside and outside, the worth 
of the esteem which his office- or position requires. 
In his official activities the classified employee 
shall pursue the common good, and, not only be impartial, 
but ao act as neither to endanger his impartiality 
nor to g ive occasion for distrust of his impartiality. 
"A classified employee shall not engage·in any 
employment, activity or enterprise which has been 
determined to be inconsistent, incompatible, or in 
conflict w·itJ:l his euties as a classified employee or 
with the duties, functions or responsibilities of the 
Appointing Authority by which he is employed. 
"Each Appointing Authority shall detennine and prescribe 
those activities which, for employees under its juris-
.. , 
FN-4 
diction, will be considered inconsist·e nt, incompatible 
or in conflict with their duties as classified 
employees. In making this determination the Appointing 
Authority shall give consideration to employment, 
activity or enterprise wfuich: (a) involves the use 
for private gain or advantage df state time, facilities, 
equipment and supplies; or, the badge, uniform, 
prestige or influence of one's state office of employ-
ment, or (b) involves receipt pr acceptance by the 
classified employee of any money or other consideration 
from anyon~ other than the State, for the performance 
of an,act which the classified employee would be 
required or expected to render in the regular course 
or hours of his state employment or as a part of his 
duties as a state classified emplo~ee, or (c) involves 
the performance of an act in other than his capacity as 
a state classified employee which act may later be 
subject d1rectly or indirectly to the control, inspection, 
review, audit or enforcement by such classified 
employee or the agency by which he is employed. 
"Each classified employee shall during his hours 
FN-5 
of duty and subject to such other laws, rules and 
regulations as pertain thereto, devote his full time, 
attention and efforts to his office or employment." 
~/ Rule 1209,2 provides: 
"Any classified employee shall resign his position 
prior to filing as a candidate for public office, 
seeking or accepting nomination for election or 
appointment as an official of a political party, 
partisan political club or organization or serving 
as a member of a committee of any such group or 
organization." 
21 Rule 1641 provides: 
t • 
"An employee of the classified service may not wear a 
political badge, button, or similar partisan emblem, 
nor may such . emplo~ee display a partisan political 
sticker or sign on an automobile operated by him or 
under his conrrol.Continued use or display . of such 
FN-6 
.· 
political material shall be deemed willful intent 
to violate the provisions of 74 O.S. 1961 § 818 
relating to prohibited political activities of classi-
fied State employees and shall subject such employee 
m~nx to dismissal pursuant to said statute." 
FN 7 
§_/- See also Niemotko v. f'1aryland, 340 U.S. 268, 285 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result in Kunz v. New York, 
340 U.S. 290 (1951)): "It is not for this Court to formulate 
with particularity the terms of a permit system which would 
satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment." 
11 In addition to the regulations promulgated by the State 
Personnel Board, the Court places some reliance on an interpretive 
circular issued by the Board and on certain opinions issued 
by the State Attorney General. Even assuming that these 
constructions should properly be considered in gauging the 
reach of the Act, they offer little real guidance to the 
meaning of the terms. The circular, for example, states that 
"The right to express political opinions is reserved to all such 
persons. Note: This reservation is subject to the prohibition 
that such persons may not take active part in political 
management or in political campaigns." See note 14 ante. 
The second half of ~hat statement merely restates the 
provision of the Act. The first ha l f can hardly be said to 
convey any fixed meaning. In fact, given the statement in the 
• 4 
Act that the right to make a private expression of political 
·.: 
FN 8 
views is protected, an employee might reaGonably interpret the 
circular to mean that "The right to express political opinions 
is reserved to all such persons, provided that such expression 
is not made in public," Similarly, the Court makes reference 
to an Opinion of the Attorney General holding, "in plain 
tenns," ante, at , that the Act applies only to "clearly 
partisan activity." I am at a loss to see how these 
statements offer any clarification of the provisions of the 
Act. 
~/ Raines concerned a prosecution under § 131 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1957, charging that the defendants, in their 
· capacity. as State officials, had discriminated against blacks 
who desired to register to vote. The defendants' conduct 
plainly fell within the permissible reach of the statute. 
But more importantly, it was not even suggested that the 
"~ statute might conceiva~ly~used to punish the exercise of 
First Amendment rights. While stating the general rule that 
a defendant normally may not assert the constitutional rights 
of a person not a party, Raines did specifically recognize 
. ~ 
FN 9 
that the rule is suspended in cases where its application 
would "itself have have an inhibitory effect on freedom of 
speech." 362 U.S., at 22. Cf. United States v. National 
Dairy Corp. ,·372 U.S. 29 (1963); Yazoo~ ~R.R. v. Jackson 
Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912). 
2./ See also Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Aptheker 
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Terminiello v. 
City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), 
lQ/ The Court has applied overbreadth review to many other 
statu:tes that assertedly had a "chilling effect" on protected 
conduct, · rather than on "pure speecl:tn." See·,.. ~·, United States 
v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 
supra; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), In none of 
these cases, or others involving conduct rather than speech, 
did the Court suggest that a defendant would lack standing to 
raise the overbreadth claim if his conduct could be proscribed 
by a narrowly drawn statute. 
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